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CIP-013-2 · CIP-002-5.1a · CIP-003-9

CIP-013 supply chain risk management: what solar, wind and battery owners should know

Who CIP-013 applies to at solar, wind and battery sites, the six vendor topics a plan must cover, and what low impact sites still owe on vendor access.

Supply chain risk is the part of NERC CIP that most renewable owners file under "someone else's problem". Inverters, battery management systems, power plant controllers and SCADA all arrive from a short list of vendors, many of them outside North America, and the vendor often keeps a remote connection for warranty and performance work. CIP-013 is the standard that asks how you manage that risk. Whether it applies to you depends on one thing: your impact rating.

This post covers who is in scope, what a CIP-013 plan has to address, and what low impact sites still owe on vendor access even though CIP-013 does not apply to them.

Who CIP-013 applies to

FERC approved the first version, CIP-013-1, in Order No. 850 in October 2018. In NERC's own words, quoted in the order, the supply chain standards "apply only to medium and high impact BES Cyber Systems."

For solar, wind and battery owners that usually means:

  • Individual plants are rarely in scope. Under CIP-002-5.1a criterion 2.1, a generating plant is medium impact only when its units add up to 1,500 MW or more at one plant location in one Interconnection. Almost every single site rates low impact.
  • The control room is where to look. Criterion 2.11 rates a Control Center medium impact when it performs Generator Operator functions for 1,500 MW or more in a single Interconnection. A remote operations center running a growing portfolio of low impact sites can cross that line, and then its BES Cyber Systems are in scope for CIP-013.
  • Low impact is outside CIP-013, but not outside the expectation. Order 850 records NERC's view that low impact systems "will likely be subject to responsible entity supply chain risk management plans" even though that is not mandatory. Many owners write one plan for the whole fleet for that reason.

What the plan has to cover

CIP-013-2, in effect in the U.S. since October 1, 2022, asks for one or more documented supply chain cyber security risk management plans for high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated EACMS (Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems) and PACS (Physical Access Control Systems). Part 1.2 lists six topics your procurement process has to address:

  • Part 1.2.1, incident notification: the vendor tells you about vendor-identified incidents in what it supplies that pose cyber security risk to you.
  • Part 1.2.2, coordinated response: how you and the vendor coordinate the response to those incidents.
  • Part 1.2.3, access no longer needed: the vendor tells you when remote or onsite access should no longer be granted to one of its representatives.
  • Part 1.2.4, vulnerability disclosure: the vendor discloses known vulnerabilities in its products or services.
  • Part 1.2.5, software integrity: you can verify the integrity and authenticity of all software and patches the vendor provides.
  • Part 1.2.6, remote access: coordination of controls for vendor-initiated remote access.

Two points from the order are worth knowing before you open a contract file:

  • The standard looks at your process, not each contract. FERC describes compliance as whether you developed processes "reasonably designed" to identify and assess vendor risk and to make the six topics "an integrated part of procurement activities."
  • Existing contracts do not need to be reopened. The standard says so directly: implementing the plan "does not require the Responsible Entity to renegotiate or abrogate existing contracts." New procurements, and renewals, are where the plan bites.
  • The plan has a review clock. R3 requires a review and CIP Senior Manager (or delegate) approval at least once every 15 calendar months.

Order 850 had directed NERC to bring EACMS into scope; CIP-013-2 went further and added PACS too, so the systems that control physical access to those BES Cyber Systems are covered as well. The next version, CIP-013-3, is part of NERC's virtualization set of standards and is scheduled to take effect in the U.S. on July 1, 2028. Supply chain also stays on the auditors' list: NERC's 2027 CMEP Implementation Plan folds Remote Connectivity, Supply Chain and Physical Security into a single Security risk element.

A worked example: an inverter advisory

In June 2026 CISA republished a Siemens advisory for KACO blueplanet solar inverters (ICSA-26-160-02). It describes two issues: Technical Service credentials that can be derived from the device serial number (CVE-2025-40946, CVSS 8.3) and an SQL injection in the KACO Meteor server (CVE-2026-41125, CVSS 6.0). Firmware fixes exist for some models; for the SQL injection the advisory says no fix is currently available, and the vendor recommends countermeasures instead.

Read it against the six topics and the plan stops being paperwork:

  • Part 1.2.4, vulnerability disclosure: how did you learn about it: from the vendor, from CISA, or from this post? If the answer is "we didn't", that is the gap.
  • Part 1.2.5, software integrity: when you apply the fixed firmware, how do you confirm the file is the vendor's own?
  • Part 1.2.6, remote access: a service credential tied to a serial number is exactly why vendor access paths need to be known, limited and switchable.

The same questions are useful at a low impact site. They just are not CIP-013 requirements there.

What low impact sites still owe on vendor access

CIP-013 does not reach low impact BES Cyber Systems, but vendor remote access does. CIP-003-9 Attachment 1 Section 6 asks low impact entities for methods to determine vendor electronic remote access, to disable it, and to detect known or suspected malicious communications on it. For a solar, wind or battery site, the practical starting point is the same as a CIP-013 plan's Part 1.2.6:

  • a list of every vendor that can connect, and how (VPN, cloud portal, cellular modem, remote desktop);
  • who on your side can switch each one off, and how fast;
  • where the session logs live, and whether you can get them without asking the vendor.

Questions to put to your vendors at the next procurement

  • Will you notify us of security events and vulnerabilities in the products you supply, and how quickly?
  • How do we verify that firmware and software updates come from you and have not been changed?
  • Which of your staff can reach our systems, and will you tell us when one of them leaves?
  • What remote access do you need, through what path, and can we turn it off ourselves?
  • Who do we call during an incident, and what will you do?

Write the answers down. For a medium impact Control Center they are evidence that the plan was used in procurement. For a low impact fleet they are the record of what vendor access exists, which Section 6 needs anyway.